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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
PEARL SPENCER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SANTA FE T:RAIL TRANSPORTATION 
Co., a Corporation, and LEONARD 
RusHING, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 6654 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
We have read appellant's brief with astonishment. 
The facts have been so carelessly handled, that a com-
plete picture cannot be acquired. We shall, therefore, 
make our own statement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is the first of a series of lawsuits growing out 
of the same accident. In the second case, Maxine Ander-
son, the driver of the car in which the present plaintiff 
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was riding, is the plaintiff and these same defendants 
are the defendants. That case has already been tried 
before the same judge who tried the instant case, with 
the same attorneys, a verdict rendered against these de-
fendants, and the appeal therein will undoubtedly be 
docketed in this court before this case is heard. A third 
case was 'brought by Rose Sorensen (variously denomi-
nated Mary Rosetta and Mary Rose Sorensen, hut here-
inafter called Rose Sorensen) the leading lady of the 
entire production, in the District Court of Sanpete Coun-
ty, from which court it was transferred to the United 
States District Court for Utah and is there now pending 
with the assurance of counsel in those cases (Mr. Ben-
jamin ~Spence), that all additional cases, two or three 
in number, will .be filed in that court, so that the remain-
ing trials, if any, may be consolidated. However, at the 
time the instant action was tried, none of the other parties 
had brought suit in any court, all stating they were 
awaiting the test run of this case before taking action. 
We feel that it will be very enlightening to this court 
and aid it materially in its consideration of this case to 
have before it the Anderson case, and for a proper solu-
tion of the Anderson case this ·court may desire to have 
before it and in mind many particulars, if not the entire 
record, in the instant ·ca.se. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of November 15, 1942, a Chevrolet 
automobile driven by one Rose Sorensen and contain-
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ing as additional passengers Emma Jensen, Ina Soren-
sen, and Cleone Jensen, was proceeding south on U. S. 
Highway 89 between Gunnison and Redrnond, Utah. 
Rose Sorensen and the other occupants of the Sorensen 
car were all employees of the Turkey Plant at or near 
Gunnison, U tab, and residents of Redmond, U tab, and 
had been riding back and forth to work together for 
several ·weeks in the Rose Sorensen car. These four 
ladies were not only lifelong friends and fellow em-
ployees and passengers, hut Ina Sorensen is Rose's 
sister-in-law, Emma Jensen is Rose's sister (R. 170, 193). 
None of them had ever seen or heard of the plaintiff in 
this case or the driver of the car in which the plaintiff 
was riding, one ~laxine Anderson, until the night of the 
accident (R. 160). 
The four ladies in the Chevrolet automobile testified 
that as they proceeded south on U. S. Highway 89 on the 
evening in question, the Santa Fe bus driven by the de-
fendant Leonard Rushing approached from the south 
going north, that approximately a mile and a half south 
of the Gunnison Sugar Factory and about opposite 
Avery Beck's home, the bus swerved or skidded or slipped 
or glided into the Chevrolet. They all testified that the 
left rear end of the bus hit the left front of the Chevro-
let. Rose Sorensen testified that the bus skidded or 
glided into her car. The impact, however, was bard 
enough to knock her dazed (R. 112, 114, 116, 126, 127, 
129). Cleone Jensen testified that the bus skidded into 
the front end of the 1Sorensen car and knocked the left 
front fender down onto the wheel so that the Chevrolet 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
car was thrown out of control. The blow was hard 
enough to make a dent in the fender and push it down 
on the wheel (R. 143, 154, 155, 156, 162). Miss Jensen 
also testified in answer to her counsel and on cross-ex-
amination as follows: 
'' Q. * * * but you do know it was the bus that 
struck you? 
A. Yes. 
By MR. JONES: 
Q. That is about the only thing you're sure of, 
isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You know if the 1bus didn't hit you that there 
is no ex·cuse for Miss Sorens·en running into 
Miss Spencer, don't you~ 
A. After the bus hit her? 
Q. You know if the hus didn't hit you, there is 
no excuse for Miss Sorensen running into the 
Anderson car~ 
A. Yes.'' (R. 168, 169). 
Along this same line Mis.s Sorensen testified that it 
was solely due to the collision ·between her car and the 
Anderson car that the plaintiff was injured and that 
she, Miss .Sorens·en, told the plaintiff and Miss Anderson 
that the bus had hit the .Sorensen car and that the only 
way Miss Spencer and Miss Anderson knew anything 
about the bus was from what she (Miss Sorensen) told 
them. She also testified that she had not ·sued the de-
fendant company and that whether or not .she did de-
pended on how this present case came out (R. 134-136). 
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Ina Sorensen testified that the bus switched into 
them~ or swerved into them, and hit them in the left 
front side and knocked her unconscious, so that she 
didn't k11ow anything· for eig·ht or nine hours (R. 176, 
177, 178, 186). 
Emina Jensen testified that she is positive that the 
rear end of the bus hit the front part of the Sorensen 
car around the front fender hard enough to knock them 
dazed (R. 199, 200, 201, 209, 210). 
Cleone Jensen was the only occupant of the car who 
was not knocked dazed (R. 143, 156). 
The testilnony of three of the ladies is to the effect 
that the in1pact with the bus was not so hard, although 
it knocked three of them dazed and threw the car com-
pletely out of control. Ina Sorensen, however, testified 
it was hard enough to knock her out for eight or nine 
hours. Rose said that the gentle gliding of the bus 
knocked her dazed until she came headon into terrific 
eollis,ion with the Anderson car, which headon collision 
brought her back to consciousness (R. 131). All of the 
four ladies testified that they customarily passed the bus 
on their way home in the evenings and that they were 
always nervous in passing it and had commented, ''Well, 
we are past the bus again.'' 
Although the witnesses were excluded from the court-
room and did not hear each other testify, the occupants 
of the Chevrolet car testified with significant unanimity 
that the left wheels of the bus were two feet over or to 
the left of the yellow line marking the center of the high-
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way and that as a result, their car went over on to the 
shoulder of the highway so that their right wheels were 
two feet off the highway. This unanimity of mathe-
matical accuracy in designating the various distances 
as two feet, and in other significant testimony, might 
indicate preliminary rehearsals and was commented on 
by us to the jury. This court may find it interesting 
when it reaches a perusal of the Anderson record to 
note the disa1ppearance of this unaruimity. 
The ladies say that after the left rear end of the 
bus hit the left front fender of their car, instead of 
knocking it to the west, their car skidded or zig-sagged 
to the east and almost completely across the highway, 
.so that they collided headon With the Anderson car, a 
Plymouth, in which the plaintiff was riding. The Ander-
son car was proceeding north following the bus, and 
after the accident the Sorensen car was headed southeast 
and the Anderson car north both on the east side of the 
road. As a re·sult of the impact between the Sorensen 
Chevrolet and the Anderson Plymouth, the plaintiff sus-
tained the injuries in question. As the two cars stood 
together after the impact, a milk truck coming from the 
south sideswiped both of them (R. 547), sideswiping the 
left side of the Plymouth and the right .side of the Chev-
rolet 'but not causing any of the damage to the left fender 
of the .Sorensen Chevrolet car. This appears from the 
entire record, and particularly the testimony of State 
Highway Patrolman Embley (R. 451-454). Nor did the 
collision with the Anderson car ·cause the damage to the 
left front fender of the Sorensen car (R. 217, 218). 
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The highway at the scene of the accident and for 
several 1niles on either side is straight. The paved sur-
face is 18 feet wide (R. 367), with a shoulder 2V2 feet 
wide to the east and 1V2 feet wide to the west (R. 429). 
The bus is 8 feet wide (R. 352) and the Chevrolet is 5 
feet wide (R. 483). The distance from the road to the 
highest point of the underside of the arc or beading of 
the left front fender on the Chevrolet is 29 inches and 
to the top of the fender, 5 inches higher (R. 482). The 
dent in the fender supposed to have been caused by the 
bus ·is above the arc or beading (Ex. 4). The distance 
from the ground to the bottom of the back bumper on 
the bus is 19¥2 inches and the bottom of the ibumper and 
the bottom of the hody of the bus are the same distance 
from the ground. The distance from the ground to the 
top of the top bumper is 2714 inches. The bumpers are 
flush with the body and do not project at all from the 
body (R. 379, 380). From the center of the wheel hous-
ing of the rear wheels of the bus to the end of the bus 
is 8 feet 7 inches and it is impossible for the bus to make 
a quick slip or turn or swerve so as to throw the rear 
end around, the bus being 39 feet 6 inches long and weigh-
ing between eleven and twelve tons empty (R. 352-353). 
Although Miss 1Sorensen and Miss Anderson state 
that Miss Sorensen claimed to Miss Anderson that the 
bus had hit her and that that was the reason for the 
collision (R.115, 229), Pearl Spencer (the plaintiff), her-
self, testified that that night there were a dozen different 
stories of how the accident happened (R. 250). 
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Miss Anderson and Miss Spencer both testified at 
the trial that as they were proceeding north on the after-
noon or evening in question, a 8anta Fe bus passed them 
going north, a half a mile from the accident and about 
thirty seconds ·before it happened, that they followed a 
,short distance behind the bus, and that its clearance 
lights were visible to them at the time the headlights or 
the Sorensen Chevrolet appeared and the Chevrolet came 
across the highway and collided with them, that the bus 
had passed the Sorensen car before they ever saw the 
.Sorensen ·car, that they didn't see the bus hit any car 
and never attributed any accident to the bus until Miss 
rSorensen told them about the bus (R. 232, 234, 278), that 
anything they know about the bus is what Miss Sorensen 
told them. At this point it is interesting to note that 
when Highway Patrolman Embly questioned Miss An-
derson in the presence of Miss Spencer in Manti on the 
Wednesday following the accident, Miss Anderson stated 
that they hadn't seen any bus that evening, that had a 
bus been ahead of them she would have noticed the num-
erous rear lights and been able to detect it, that he was 
trying to find out if the bus was involved in the accident 
and asked Miss Anderson, ''If there was something ahead 
of you (referring to the ibus), Maxine, don't you think 
you would have known it was the bus~" She said, "Yes, 
I imagine I would." (R. 413 et s·eq., 445). The purpose 
of Officer Embley's visit to Miss Anderson was to find 
out if a bus was involved in the accident and she told 
him she didn't see the bus at all. Mis.s 8pencer was 
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present at the conversation and made no contrary de-
clarations. 
The defendant driver of the bus knew nothing of 
any accident, stated that he was not involved in any acci-
dent, did not drive on the wrong side of the road, did 
not skid or swerve, that it would be impossible with this 
bus to n1ake it suddenly skid or swerve, and that in order 
to make a turn to throw the rear end of the bus to the 
west it would be necessary to head the bus so to the east 
that the bus would 'be occupying the entire highway and 
completely off of it to the east at least half the length 
of the bus. 
On the evening in question the bus reached Gunnison 
about 6 :40 or 6 :45 and proceeded over the Levan cutoff 
on Highway 28, then !back onto the main road into Santa-
quin where the driver disembarked his passengers and 
baggage, loaded them onto a leased Utah Transportation 
Company bus for carriage on into Salt La.ke City, and 
bus 392, the bus in question with a new driver, turned 
around and went back over the road it had previously 
traveled. He and his passengers then proceeded on into 
Salt Lake City and 392 went back to Phoenix (R. 296-
297). The reason f.or the change of passengers was that 
one of the Santa Fe buses had broken down some time 
prior to November 15 at Redmond, Utah, and that it was 
necessary to lease a bus from the Utah Transportation 
Company in order to maintain the 1Santa Fe schedule; 
that on the 14th and 15th of November passengers had 
been changed from the Santa Fe bus to the leased bus, 
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on the 14th at Payson and on the 15th at Santaquin (the 
leased bus on both days left Salt Lake City before the 
time of the claimed collision), and the fact that this 
change would ~be made had been communicated to the 
passengers of bus 392 when they boar-ded the bus on the 
15th and long before the time of the claimed accident 
(R. 342-347, 465, 466, 500, 512, 513, 519). On the 15th of 
November bus 392 stopped at Remond before the claimed 
collision and discharged parts for the broken down bus 
there and then proceeded on iits way (R. 348-349). This 
broken down bus at Redmond was also se-en by Miss 
Anderson and Miss Spencer and the passengers on the 
bus. 
Bus 392, the bus driven by Mr. Rushing on the 15th 
of November, returned to Phoenix on the 16th, had the 
regular two thousand mile service, which C?nsisted of 
putting on the winter radiator cover and the brakes and 
heater che-cked, left Phoenix on the 17th, and on the 18th 
was proceeding over Highway 89 on the same route as 
it had traversed on November 15th (testimony of Mr. 
Griffith, R. 299-338). This bus was also driven by Rush-
ing on the 18th and was stopped and examined by High-
way Patrolman Embley on the Levan cutoff, Highway 28, 
about four miles south of Levan. As already stated, the 
driver knew nothing of any accident, there were no re-
pairs made on the bus, and there were no marks on it 
indicating that it had been in an accident such as de-
scribed by the OGcupants of the Sorensen car. The ma-
terial of which the bus is constructed would readily show 
any collision, both 'by !indentations in the material itself 
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and by loss of paint, and could not be repaired without 
patching or removing of a panel and repainting, all of 
which would be readily discovered upon examination 
Griffith and En1bley testimony). 
"\Yhen :Mr. Rushing first learned of the claimed acci-
dent a day or so later, he inunediately contacted the 
ticket agents along his route to determine the names of 
the passengers on his bus on the 15th of November, and 
as a result of this investigation s·ecured the names of 
several passengers, every one of whom that could be 
discovered and subpoenaed, was subpoenaed and testi-
fied in the case. None of them knew of any accident, had 
ever heard of any accident, felt any skid, swerve, jolt, 
impact, or anything else to indicate anything unusual 
on November 15th. All of them and the bus driver 
stated that they did not drive on the wrong side of the 
road, that the trip was very uneventful and peaceful, 
that they were none of them acquainted with the driver 
and were present at the trial solely by reason of sub-
poena. All of them testified that the driver drove in a 
proper and careful manner, so that the trip was very 
restful and uneventful. 
It is interesting to note that all four occupants of 
the Sorensen car and the plaintiff, Pearl Spencer, de-
scribed the bus with great positiveness and particularity 
and stated that it was a light color at the bottom and dark 
color at the top described by some as a cream color at 
the ·bottom and orange-red at the top and that they could 
positively not be nustaken in this. As a matter of fact, 
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~bus 392 and all the Santa Fe buses are colored in just 
the opposite way, orange-red at the bottom and cream 
color at the top (Griffith testimony, R. 316-317 and Ex-
hibits 1 and 2). 
It will be interesting tin exannn1ng the Anderson 
record to note the squirmings and wrigglings and twist-
ings of counsel to account for the color scheme attributed 
to the· bus by the same witnesses in the Spencer case. 
In an atten1pt to account for the dan1age to the left 
front fender of the Chevrolet car, the defendant Rushing 
recalled that he passed a truck going north immediately 
after he had left Redmond and that this truck had a pro-
jecting body about the height of the damage to the fender. 
Plaintiff's couns·el examined witness after witness on 
behalf of the plaintiff as to the presence of any truck 
and all of them denied that any truck was in the vicinity 
of the accident. Then the plaintiff's counsel, toward the 
end of the case, called as his witness a Mr. Whitlock 
previously subpoenaed by the defendants but not used, 
and this witness definitely testified that there was a truck 
traveling tin a northerly direction immediately in the 
vicinity of. the accident and that it almost hit his car 
and was running without any signal or clearance lights. 
True, Mr. Whitlock stated that the truck was ahead of 
the bus instead of ·behind it, but the detailed accuracy ot 
his m;emory can be ascertained by this court on an ex-
amination of the Anderson r·ecord wherein Mr. Whitlock 
testified at that trial that the truck had ·clearance lights 
on it. 
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rrhe left front fender of the Sorensen (Chevrolet) 
car was not produced or offered in evidence at the trial. 
Two or three weeks before the trial, Mr. Wilkinson, one 
of plaintiff's attorneys, had the fender removed from the 
car at Centerfield, Utah, and took it away with him, but 
it never appeared in the court room in the trial of this 
case. Neither did plaintiff offer any pictures of either 
the fender, the Chevrolet car, or the defendant's bus. In 
fact, when defendants offered photographs of the fender 
and the Chevrolet car as they appeared after the accident 
(Exhibits 3 and 4), plaintiff strenuously objected to the 
offer (R. 383-387) and they were received in evidence 
over plaintiff's objection, although it was established 
without dispute that they correctly represent the condi-
tion of the fender on November 15th after the accident 
(R. 393). We commented on these matters to the jury, 
apparently effectively. 
We have stated the evidence somewhat in detail in 
an effort to give this court some idea of the skepticism 
we felt that plaintiff's evidence created at the trial of 
this case and resulted in the verdict of no cause of action. 
CRITICISM OF PLAI,NTIFF'S STATEMENT 
OF THE CASE 
Inaccuracies, contradictions and dubious insinua-
tions are encountered through appellant's brief. We 
comment on them as they appear seriatim in the brief: 
On page 2 plaintiff says with reference to defendants: 
"However, they do admit that the bus was in the exact 
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location of the accident at the approximate time the in-
juries complained of occurred,'' as though there were 
something sinister in the presence of the bus on the high-
way and some attempt of concealment on our part. There 
is no question of any admission. Anyone could deter-
mine from the published schedules where on Highway 89 
the Santa Fe bus would be at any approximate time. 
Many other vehicles were in the exact location of the 
accident at the approximate time the injuries complained 
of occurred. That is no admission that they were in-. 
volved in plaintiff's accident. 
Plaintiff states on pa.ge 2 that the testimony of the 
occupants of the Sorensen car is undenied except on one 
point. This is highly inaccurate. The only material 
thing that is undenied in their evidence is that they col-
lided with the Anderson vehicle. It is emphatically 
denied that tbe bus was traveling on the wrong side of 
the road, that it skidded, sLid, swerved or glided sud-
denly or otherwise. 
It is established, in the faee of plaintiff's witnesses' 
denial to the contrary, that there was a truck ·so con-
structed as to he capable of causing the damage to the 
left front fender of the Chevrolet on the highway at the 
time and place in question, and the physical facts make 
it extremely improbable, if not impossU.ble, for the bus 
to have ·collided with the Chevrolet car as described by 
the occupants of that .car. There are no marks whatever 
on the bus to indicate ·such a collision, there is nothing 
on the bus that could have caused the damage to the 
Chevrolet fender, and it is absolutely impossible for the 
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bus to make a sudden swerve or glide in one direction 
so as to co1ne in contact merely with one portion of the 
other car. The highest part of the bus bumper is sev-
eral inches below the lowest part ·Of the crease in the 
Chevrolet fender, the bumper does not ,project !beyond 
the body of the bus and could not cause the crease in 
any event. This crease was the main point of comment 
throughout the trial. In the Anderson trial at the end 
of his final argument to the jury, plaintiff'·s counsel 
abandoned any claims as to this crease and declared the 
point of collision was at the bottom of the front of the 
fender. 
It is also interesting to note that from the plaintiff's 
own evidence her portion of the street is nine feet wide. 
If the bus was over the center line two feet, that would 
still leave seven feet of pavement. The Chevrolet is 
five feet wide and it would have a space of at least two 
feet to pass the bus without leaving the paven1ent. 
Bla.intiff's witnesses say the Chevrolet went off the pave-
ment two feet, which would leave a space of four feet 
between the bus and the Chevrolet, according to plain-
tiff's own witnesses. The bus projects eight and a half 
feet beyond the rear wheels. It would be utterly im-
possible for this huge bus to make a four-foot skid with 
the rear end alone without violently affecting the 
remainder of the bus. If the bus was turned suddenly 
to make such a swerve, the whole front part of it would 
be entirely off the pavement and into the barrow pit 
on the east. Also, if this huge bus made a four-foot 
flip into the plaintiff's car, plaintiff's car would not 
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have been knocked to the east but would have been 
knocked violently a considerable distance to the west. It 
just doesn't happen that a bus of this size and weight 
goes up and down the highway flipping its rear end back 
and forth like a cow infe·sted with gad flies, and cer-
tainly not to the complete oblivion of all the pass·engers, 
who were not only unaware of the tail flipping propensi-
ties of their ··conveyance but of the fact that it was travel-
ing upside down with the cream colored part at the bot-
tom and the orange-red at the top. And so for the plain-
tiff to say that the story of the occupants of the Soren-
sen ·car is undenied except in one point is to imitate the 
ostrich hiding its head in the sand in the belief that 
other vulnerable portions are likewise concealed. 
On page 4 plaintiff states that there were three 
separate collisions on the highway and ''this is also 
admitted.'' How can counsel say that we admit that there 
were three separate collisions when on page 2 they ex-
pressly state: ''Defendants deny that the Santa Fe bus 
struck the rSorensen car.'' Counsel should be more 
meticulous in examining their statements to see that 
they are not inconsistent. As a matter .of fact, we do· not 
believe, and neither did the jury, that our bus ever had 
anything to do, either by way of collision or otherwise, 
with plaintiff's accident. .So counsel is entirely in error 
in stating that we admit that there were three collisions. 
Also on page 4 of their brief counsel state that 
Maxine Anderson's story is substantially the same as 
the plaintiff's. We have already pointed out that Maxine 
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Anderson testified that they were following the,bus, could 
see its lights, saw its lights pass the Sorensen car, saw 
no collision with the Sorensen car, and after the bus 
had passed the Sorensen car that car careened across 
the highway and collided with her automobile. Officer 
Embley testified that three days later Maxine Anderson, 
with the plaintiff herein acquiescing by her silence, stated 
she had not seen the bus and did not know what was in 
front of her. 
On page 6 of their brief counsel drag out of thin 
air and attach to the plaintiff a lisp and state that the 
record doesn't reveal her age but that she is a young 
girl in her twenties. Neither of these facts is of any im-
portance except for the purpose of showing counsel's 
disregard for the record. Mr. McCullough at the trial 
asked the plaintiff if the lisp that she had was caused 
by the accident and on cross-examination defendants' 
counsel wondered what lisp was meant and asked her 
what impediment she had. The plaintiff said her words 
were slurry and her s 's were terrible, but it was not ap-
parent to anyone listening to her and we were unable 
(and apparently the jury also) to detect that her words 
were slurry and her s 's were terrible. .Also, on page 
248 of the Record plaintiff testified that she was twenty-
six years old. 
Again on page 7 counsel uses the verb "admitted" 
in describing the presence of the bus in the vicinity of 
the accident and impliedly again assert that all we con-
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tended was that we didn't run into the Sorensen car. 
We have already covered these points. 
Probably the most glaring misstatement is found on 
page 8 and again on page 10 of appellant's brief as 
follows: 
and 
''The reason for changing passengers at Santa-
quin and returning to Phoenix without going to 
Salt Lake City was unexplained. This was es-
pecially peculiar in view of the fact that the de-
fendant claimed that the bus had been undam-
aged.'' 
''Why did not the bus come to Salt Lake City?" 
These two statements lead us to believe that someone 
other than counsel whose names are subscdbed to ap-
pellant's brief participated in the preparation of the 
brief, since certainly none of those attorneys would have 
the temerity (or would they) to think they could get 
away with that in this court. Page after page of the 
record is devoted to that very fact. In Mr. Rushing's 
testimony and also in the testimony of every one of the 
passengers except Leah Cherrington the reason for the 
change appears, and the fact that the change would be 
made was known long before the time plaintiff claimed 
the accident occurred. The day before this accident, a 
similar change of buses was made at Payson. On the 
day of the accident a change was made at Santaquin 
and the reason for the change was that one of the buses 
had broken down and was waiting for repairs at Red-
j 
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mond, and on this very trip, before bus 392 ever reached 
the scene of the accident, it had stopped at Redmond 
and left repair parts for the broken down bus (R. 343-
348 and testimony of bus passengers). In fact, both 
Miss Anderson and 1\'liss Spencer stated that on this 
trip they saw the broken down bus at Redmond (R. 231, 
232, 245). These misstatements in the brief, in view of 
the record, are nothing more nor less than presumption 
and effrontery. 
Again on page 8 of her brief appellant uses the word 
''admit'' in describing testimony of the defendants. There 
is no question here of admissions, as though we had been 
forced into a corner to confess something that had to be 
wrung out of us. Appellant states that we admit that 
the bus was eight feet wide and that we admit that the 
bus was the only bus that runs between Redmond and 
Gunnison between six and seven o'clock in the evening. 
In the first place, anyone could testify to the width of 
the bus by measuring it or to the schedule of the Santa 
Fe Transportation Company and the mere fact that 
the o~cupants of the .Sorensen car used this knowledge 
to fasten an impossible situation upon us cannot be con-
strued as an admission on our part when we state facts 
that everyone knows. In the second place, the Rio 
Grande Trailways run over this same route and some-
times run in the evening off schedule (R. 381). As a 
matter of fact, no bus, Rio Grande or Santa Fe, could 
have caused the damage to the Sorensen left front 
fender. 
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Again on page 9 appellant says with reference to 
Exhibits 3 and 4 that the witness "admitted" that the 
pictures do not reflect the true condition of the Sorensen 
car on November 15. Exactly the opposite is the fact. 
The witness G. Vl. Sorensen, a mechanic, testified that 
the only thing he did was to raise the fender probably 
an inch and a half to get it off the wheel so he could 
move the car, that the pictures (Exbil:bits 3 and 4) were 
taken in the rear of his garage at Centerfield, Utah, and 
that the exhibits correctly portray the body and fender 
of the Chevrolet when he picked it up the night of No-
vember 15 after the accident (R. 393). 
Another misstatement is also found on page 9 of 
the brief. In commenting on the testimony of Highway 
Patrolman Embly, appellant says that Embley went to 
the Beck residence and ''had some discussion with Cleone 
Jensen, which d[scussion his counsel did not permit him 
to relate." We assume that by the statement ''his coun-
sel" appellant means us, since we offered and were ex-
amining the witness. As a matter of fact, the record 
shows that Mr. McCullough, appellant's counsel, ob-
jected to the witness answering the question as to what 
Cleone Jensen said: 
'' EMBLEY: So I talked to Cleone Jensen at 
that time. She seemed to be the one that was 
Jeast injured, and she was the one tba t told me 
what had happened. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Just a minute. We ob- · 
ject to this on the ground it is incompetent, ir-
relevant, immaterial, hearsay. 
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THE CouRT: I haven't heard any hearsay 
yet. 
Q. (By Mr. Strong): Were you going into 
what Cleone told you- don't say what she told 
you. Say what you observed from then on.'' 
On page 10 appellant's counsel say: 
"Note that there is no evidence from witness 
Embley that he ever examined bus No. 392, which 
was the bus driven by Leonard Rushing on the 
night of the accident.'' 
It is difficult to understand why counsel make .such mis-
leading statements. Mr. Rushing testified that on No-
vember 18 on his trip north he was driving 392, and that 
by pre-arrangement he met Patrolman Embly on the 
Levan cut-off and that Patrolman Embly examined the 
bus thoroughly (R. 357, 358, 359), and Patrolman Embley 
testified that he examined every Santa Fe bus that came 
through, not only 392, but every one of them, and that 
on November 18 on the Levan cut-off he examined the 
bus driven by Mr. Rushing (R. 405-409). He found no 
evidence of any collision marks on any of the buses. 
Counsel state on page 10 of their brief that High-
way Patrolman Embley ''admitted" that there were tire 
marks on the west shoulder of the road north Qf the 
point of collision between the Anderson and Sorensen 
cars as corroboration of the testimony of the occupants 
of the Sorensen car that they had driven off the high-
way to avoid being struck by the bus. As a matter of 
fact, Officer Embley testified that there were no marks 
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on the highway indicating how the accident happened. 
"I did not find any marks on the road that night from 
the shoulder or any other place" (R. 410-411). With 
reference to the west shoulder itself, he stated that 
50 to 100 feet north of the point of collision between the 
two cars he found tire marks on the west shoulder and 
that they were made from cars that were stopping there 
all the time, that if there had been any skid marks, they 
would still have been present but there were none (R. 
430-431). The tire marks on the west shoulder were all. 
along there from the cars that had stopped there on 
account of the collision between the Anderson and 
Sorensen cars ( R. 410, 454). 
On page 11 appellant's counsel say that Exhi•bit B 
(Embley's notes) indicated that Cleone Jensen stated 
;. 
that on the night of the accident the Sorensen car and 
the bus had collided, the impression being that on the 
night of the accident Cleone Jensen had stated that the 
bus collided with the Sorensen car. As a matter of fact, 
Embley stated that he didn't get any of the statements 
the night of the accident but got them on the next day 
(R. 436), including Cleone Jensen's statement. 
On page 12 appellant ooplies that the bus ride for 
the passengers was one of turmoil and confusion by 
saying: 
''They all stated that it was a stormy night and 
that the bus was crowded." 
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As a matter of faet, all of the passengers said it was a 
peaceful, uneventful, restful trip, and when counsel at-
tempted to inject a blinding storm into it, one of the 
witnesses said that one of the appealing things about the 
trip was her observation in the snowstorm of the 
pheasants along the roadway. The bus ride was a warm, 
con1fortable, pleasant trip with nothing whatever oc-
curring to disturb the equanimity of any of these lady 
passengers. 
On page 12 appellant tries to give the impression 
that we bad spirited a witness, Mr. Whitlock, away from 
the trial. :Mr. vVhitlock's testimony was at variance 
with a statement he had previously given to us, in which 
statement he stated that the truck was following the 
bus. Then later he stated that the bus was following the 
truck. In his statement and also in his evidence he 
stated that the truck had no elearance lights on it, while 
in his testimony in the Anderson case he stated that the 
truck had clearance lights on it. .About the only thing he 
remained firm about was that the truck almost hit his 
car. We, nevertheless, subpoenaed him and intended to 
use him and counsel knows, as the record clearly dis-
closes, why he was excused. Mr. Whitlock stated at the 
trial: 
"BY MR. JONES (R. 548): 
Q. Mr. Whitlock, Mr. McCullough asked you if 
you had been subpoenaed by the defendant 
and not used; that is right, isn't it 1 
A. That is right. 
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A. I was. 
Q. You told me you had to get back the next day, 
didn't you? 
A. I did. Yes. 
Q. And you couldn't wait over Y 
A. That is right. 
Q. Without great financial loss to you, and so 
I said, 'Well, you go ahead. ' 
A. That is correct. 
Q. The plaintiff brought you back, and not me? 
A. They did.'' 
The only mystery B.Jbout the matter is appellant's coun-
sel's mention of the episode in their brief. It is akin to 
the other mysteries in the story told by their witnesses. 
It is significant, however, that Mr. Whitlock testified to 
the presence of a truck without lights that nearly ran 
into him. These details appellant fails to call to our 
attention. 
ARGUMENT 
While appellant has specified 16 errors, she has dis· 
eussed but 2 propositions : 
"PROPOSJlTION I. THE TESTIMONY INTRODUCED 
BY DEFENDANT'S OF ROSE SORENSEN'S FAILURE TO 
HAVE A DRIVER'S LliCENiSE, AND COUNSEL FOR THE 
DEFENDANT'S DIS,CUSSION OF SUtCH EVIDENCE BE-
FORE THE JUiiY ·CONSTITUTED' REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHICH DENIED TO THE DEFEND'ANT A FAIR AND IM· 
PARTIAL TRIA!L. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
AAOPOSITION II. THE COURT ERREn IN LIMIT-
ING THE JURY TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR 
NOT DEFENDANT'S BUS STRUCK THill AUTOMOBILE 
DRIVEN BY ROSE SORENSEN, AND ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO INSTRtUCT THE JURY THAT IF SAID BUS CHOW.DE'D 
ROSE SORENSEN'S CAR OFF THE ROAD AND THEREBY 
PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO PLAINTIFF'S IN-
JURIES THEN .SAID BUS OOMP ANY WOULn BE LIABLE." 
VvT e shall, therefore, discuss only the specifications of 
error covered by the two propositions. Several of the 
specifications of error, such as 8, 9, 10, 12, and 14 on pages 
14 and 15 of the brief, undoubtedly were abandoned by 
appellant in view of the fact that the instructions re-
quested are merely repetitious and were fully covered 
by equally, if not more, exhaustive instructions given 
by the court. 
Coming ~ow to Proposition I. Appellant complains 
that we introduced testimony that Rose Sorensen didn't 
have a driver's license and of our comments to the jury 
referring to her absence of a driver's license as one of 
her reasons for desiring to direct attention from herself 
to the defendant company and take the onus of an in-
vestigation from her own shoulders and place it on ours. 
Appellant then cites several authorities to the effect that 
failure to have a driver's license will not deprive a per-
son of his right to recover for injuries inflicted on him 
through negligence of another unless the absence of the . 
license has a ·causal connection with the accident. We 
find it somewhat difficult to understand why appellant 
has cited these authorities, since we never contended 
that Rose Sorensen's lack· of a driver's license would 
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deprive the plaintiff of her cause of action, if any, against 
us. That the ·court was of the same' opinion is abundantly 
apparent in instrucion No. 8 to the jury wherein we 
thought the court went a good deal farther than was 
proper in elhninating anything pertaining to Rose 
Sorensen from the consideration of the jury (this in-
struction will be referred to more extensively later). We 
did not introduce testimony that Rose 8orensen had no 
driver's license. We knew she didn't have one. We 
asked her why she didn't have one, and appellant herself 
produced this evidence later in page 2 of her Exhibit B 
and her examination of the witness Embley with refer-
ence thereto (R. 439). This witness was the one from 
whom we also received our information that Rose Soren-
sen had no driver's license. We in our cross examina-
tion were trying to find some basis for the weird story 
told by Miss Sorensen. We knew that our bus had not 
been !involved in any accident and had not sideswiped 
or collided wti.th any car. At that point in the trial we 
did not know that Miss Spencer and Miss Anderson were 
going to state that the bus was anywhere in the vicinity 
of the accident at the time it occurred, since they ,had led 
Officer Embley to believe that they had not seen the 
bus that day and that if it had been in front of them, they 
would cerainly have seen it. Miss Sorensen had testified 
that she and all the other occupants of her car were very. 
nervous every time the bus passed them and we were 
wondering if her nervousness was of such a nature as to 
prevent her from getting a driver's license. Certainly 
she had no right to be driving the car on that occasion 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
without a driver's license and if her nervousness had 
prevented her from getting a license, we were certainly 
entitled to know that, espedally in view of the fact that 
we know of no reason why she collided head-on with the 
Anderson car. Our bus showed no evidence of any con-
tact with her car, and certainly no collision with our bus 
could have accounted for the damage to the left front 
fender of her car or her fantastic statement that the bus 
had glided gently into her but with sufficient force to 
knock her dazed and that the terrific impact with the 
Anderson car brought her to. If her nervousness and 
her inability to secure a driver's license caused her to 
go off the west side of the road and then careen over to 
the east side, she and not ourselves were responsible for 
the accident, and the fact that she had no driver's license 
certainly required an inquiry and explanation of why 
she didn't have one. We had contended all along that 
we had nothing to do with the accident. Rose ,Sorensen 
was the one who ran into the Anderson car and certainly 
any evidence affecting her credibility or explaining 
her reasons for trying to divert attention from herself 
to somebody else was not only competent and material, 
·but highly relevant, particularly in view of the fact that 
neither she nor any of the occupants of her car had sued 
us. We never contended that if the bus had actually hit 
the Sorensen car the fact that Miss 8orentSen had no 
· driver's license would deprive the plaintiff of her right 
of action against us and the court plainly and emphatical-
ly told the jury that plaintiff could not be held responsi-
ble for anything Rose 1Sorensen did if our bus had bit 
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her car. If Rose Sorensen's nervousness was the cause 
of her erratic driving so that she could not secure a 
driver's license, that would explain how she happened to 
go off the road on the west side and then cross over to 
the east side and hit the Anderson car. Certainly it 
ta~es credulity to believe that our heavy bus could have 
hit her and the blow of the bus deflect her course to the 
east in the same direction from which the alleged force 
came, instead of to the west and down into the barrow 
pit <immediately adjacent to the west shoulder as laws-
of physics would seem to require. We were then and 
are now entirely in the dark as to why Rose Sorensen 
collided with the Anderson car and were enti tied to dis-
cover if we could any reason for her actions that night. 
It will be noted that both our question on cross-
examination and our reference to the driver's license in 
argument to the jury are directed solely to the credi-
bility of the witness in her efforts to divert attention 
from herself to us, the innocent bystander, as the cause 
of the accident. 
In stating their Proposition I, appellant's counsel 
~ay, ''The t~stimony introduced by defendants of Rose 
Sorensen's failure to have a driver's license," etc. We 
did not introduce any evidence that she didn't have a 
driver's license. That was done by appellant's own 
counsel by means of their Exhibit B. All we did was 
ask Miss Sorensen why she didn't have one. Appellant 
was under no compulsion or necessity to offer Exhibit 
B in evidence. Her counsel knew it was incompetent 
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and hearsay, but notwithstanding that, he 1nade a play 
of it before the jury, waving it around in front of the 
jury and the witness, and probably no one was rnore 
surprised than appellant's counsel himself at our con-
sent to the reception in evidence of his Exhibit B. Ap-
pellant's counsel asked the witness Embley if he had 
made any rnenwrandum. Upon receiving an affirmative 
answer, he asked for the n1emorandum and then asked 
the indulgence of the court while he proceeded to read 
it to himself in the presence of the court and jury. He 
then asked to have it marked and said (R. 432, 433): 
"Now, turning to the second page of what has 
been marked for identification as Exhibit 'B ', is 
there anv memoranda there with reference to what 
Maxine Anderson said to you~'' 
(It will be noted that on the second page also appears 
under the heading Rose .Sorensen, the following: ''No 
operator's license''). Of course we objected to this 
method of pro·cedure and insisted that we should have a 
right to lo·ok at the exhibit and that if he was going to 
examine with reference to these notes, they should be 
offered in evidence before such an examination took 
place. Counsel persisted in his efforts and we insisted 
on seeing the notes. Counsel protested that he didn't 
want ''to disclose my hand to the attorneys on the other 
side." Mr. Embley stated that the information contained 
in the notes w.as received from the persons questioned 
the day after the accident and that he did not get the 
information from them the night of the accident. This 
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colloquy covers five or six pages of the record (R. 432-
437). The following appears on page 437 : 
''MR. McCuLLOUGH : As part of the cross 
examination of this witness, we would like to 
offer in evidence the Exhibit B, including all of 
the statements which he has here with reference 
not only to Maxine Anderson, but each and every 
one of the witnesses, as to what they told him, 
as far .as the accident is concerned. 
MR. JONEs: Mr. McCullough knows it is ab-
solutely irncompetent. * * * but I haven't any 
objection to its going in. 
THE 1COURT: I thought you were going to 
I object to it. 
MR. JoNES: It is objectionable, and he knows 
it is, but I am going to let the jury see it. He has 
made this play before them; let them see it. 
MR. ~IcCuLLOUGH : No play at all. 
THE CouRT: Let's go ahead. No objection? 
MR. JONEs: It is all right. 
THE CouRT: It. may be received." 
Thus appellant's counsel himself offered the evidence 
that Rose Sorensen had no operator's license. All we 
did was question her as to why she didn't have one. 
Not satisfied with having put the exhibit in evi-
dence, counsel then proceeded to go over the memorandum 
item by item (R. 439) : 
'' Q. And the next page, you got 'Rose Soren-
sen'? 
A. The driver. 
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Q. 'Rednwnd, Utah'. That is her address~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. 'Age 49 '. Is that correct~ 
A. Yes. 
· Q. 'One year driving.' Correct~ 
A. Yes sir, one year driving experience, that is. 
Q. And then it shows 'No operator's license'. 
A. That is right.'' 
It is thus somewhat ludicrous for counsel to ohject to 
our asking Rose 8orensen why she didn't have a li·cense 
when he is the one who later insisted on presenting to 
the jury the positive evidence that she didn't have the 
license. 
Even if we were to assume that the cross examina-
tion is erroneous in the first instance, which it was not, 
any complaint appellant may have had was certainly 
waived by the voluntary conduct of her own counsel in 
offering the only positive evidence there is of the non-
existence of her driver's license. In this state, as in 
most jurisdictions, we have definite statutory enactments 
that would preclude appellant taking advantage of any 
such situation even had our cross examination been im-
proper, which it was not. Section 104-14-7, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, provides : 
''The court must in every stage of an action 
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or 
proceedings which does not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties, and no judgment shall be 
reversed or affected by reason of such error or 
defect.'' 
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Also, Section 104-39-3, as follows: 
''No exception shall be regarded, unless the 
decision excepted to is material and prejudicial 
to the swbstantial rights of the party excepting.'' 
Certainly ~n the face of counsel's own conduct, nothing 
that we did was prejudicial or effected the substantial 
rights of the plaintiff. The jury would have known of 
Rose Sorensen's lack of a driver's li·cense if we bad 
never said a word. Counsel was, to use an expressive 
colloquialism, "hell bent" on getting Exhibit B in evi-
dence or els·e malcing the jury believe it contained some-
thing we were afraid of, even though he knew it was 
~ncompetent. Counsel is thus hoist with his own petard. 
As this court said in B. T. Moran, Inc., v. First 
Security Corporation, 82 Utah 316, 24 P. (2d) 384, at 
page 327 of the U tab Reports : 
"With the copy of the telegram eliminated there 
was sufficient evidence to support a finding that 
notice of withdrawal of the offer was communi-
cated to the agent before acceptance of the con-
tract by the principal at Chicago." 
In that case evidence claimed to be incompetent was' re-
ceived over objection, but later the same information 
was put in without objection and thus no prejudice oc-
curred. Paraphrasing the language of this court in that 
case, we could say: 
"With the cross examination of Rose Sorensen 
eliminated there was sufficient evidence to support 
a finding that she had no driver's license." 
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Also in the case of Schofield v. Zion's Co-op. Mer-
cantile lnstit,ution, 85 Utah 281, 39 P. (2d) 342, where 
con1plaint was made of the introduction of certain let-
ters but the infonnation contained in the letters was 
subsequently otherwise received in evidence, this court 
at page 294 of the Utah Report says: 
'' Furthernwre no dispute is made in the record 
as to the facts recited in the letters, so they could 
in no wise be prejudicial.'' 
In the case of V a;n Leewwen v. Huffaker, 78 Utah 
521, 5 P. (2d) 714, secondary evidence as to the contents 
of a written instrument was received without the proper 
foundation being laid for its reception. Objection was 
made, which was overruled. This court held that it was 
error to overrule the objection but that the error was 
rendered harmless by what transpired afterwards dur-
ing the trial. The same evidence as was contained in 
the secondary evidence was offered and received orally 
and this court on page 534 of the Utah Reports says: 
''It thus appears that defendant himself in 
his own testimony admitted substantially all that 
plaintiff sought to prove by the contract * * *. 
Such being the state of the record, we do not see 
how the error of the trial court could have result-
ed in any prejudice to the substantial rights of 
the defendant.'' (Citing Com. Laws Utah 1917, 
Sec. 6622, which is the same as our present 104-
14-7). 
See also 3 Am. Jur., p. 583. 
Still bearing in mind then that the failure of Ros·e 
Sorensen to have a driver's license was never advanced 
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as an argument to deprive plaintiff of her cause of 
action if our bus had actually run into Rose .Sorensen's 
car, let us advert briefly to appellant's ohjection to the 
refusal of the court to instruct the jury that failure to 
have a driver's license was immaterial. Counsel re-
quested the court to single out this one bit of evidence 
and emphasize it by giving instructions directed to that 
point alone. That it is bad practice to sti.ngle out one 
p'articular piece of evidence and emphasize it in instruc-
tions has been held so often as to require no citation of 
authority. In addition to that, no one ever claimed that 
the manner in which Rose Sorensen operated her auto-
mo·bile could defeat plaintiff's right of recovery if our bus 
had run into Rose .Sorensen's car. Rose .Sorensen's negli-
gence or contributory negligence was not an issue in the 
case, even though appellant's counsel against her interest 
tried to make it an issue. Counsel attempted to make it 
an issue by his request for instructions 9 and 11. The 
·court, however, in instruction No. 8 not only in effect 
instructed the jury that Rose Sorensen's conduct in this 
respect was immaterial, but stated specifically that if 
the bus struck the Sorensen car causing it to beoome 
uncontrollable and unmanagea:ble, plaintiff was entitled 
to recover regardless of anything ,Rose >Sorensen did. 
The instruction is in full as follows : 
''Instruction No. 8 
You are ~nstructed that even though you be-
lieve that Ros.e Sorensen may not have been 
operating her automobile in a careful and prudent 
~anner at the time it was allegedly struck by 
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the def0ndant eon1pany 's bus, nevertheless if 
you do ~believe, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant company's bus was, at 
the time and place in question, being operated in 
a negligent manner, as set forth in these instruc-
tions, and as a direct result of such negligence, 
if any, struck the Rose Sorensen car, causing the 
smne to become uncontrollable and unmanageable, 
and for that reason causing a collision with the 
Anderson car, as a result of which plaintiff was 
injured, then you will find for the plaintiff, regard-
less of whether or not Rose Sorensen was driving 
her automobile in a proper or an improper man-
ner.'' 
Appellant's counsel have failed to comment upon or 
call this instruction to this court's attention. This is 
hardly consistent with frankness or with dealing fairly 
with the trial court. If the jury believed our bus hit 
the Sorensen car, this instruction eliminated from con-
sideration by the jury our cross examination with refer-
ence to the driver's license, our mention of it to the 
jury in our argument, and appellant's own evidence that 
Miss Sorensen didn't have a license. It also corrected 
any prior error, (we claim there was none) that may have 
occurred, ·by withdrawing the whole matter of Rose 
Sorensen's conduct from the consideration of the jury. 
It thus more emphatically appears that no prejudice 
resulted to the plaintiff, nor were her substantial rights 
affected. As this court has said on many occasions, "If 
any errors were committed in this respect, the same were 
cured by the court's instruction to the jury, and there-
fore no useful purpose can be served by a discussion of 
these assignments in this opinion." Campbell v. Los 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
Angeles & 8. L. R. Co., 71 Utah 173, 263 P. 495, page 180 
I 
of the Utah Reports; Ludlow v·. Los Angeles & 8. L. R. 
Co., 73 Utah 513, 275 P. 592, page 519 of the Utah Re-
ports. In Trimble v. Union Pacific Stages, 142 P. (2d) 
67 4, at page 677, this court as late as October 27, 1943, 
said: 
''The instructions given are not models and could 
have been improved upon. However, they sub-
stantially cover the material requested, and there-
fore it was not prejudicial error to refuse 
plaintiffs' request, since the substance thereof was 
giv,en in other instructions.'' 
It also will be noted that ·counsel for appellant made 
no objection to our argument to the jury, no request to 
the court to instruct the jury with reference to it, and 
thus is in no po!sition in this court to complain of the 
matter even if he could have done so at the time of trial. 
This proposition is well settled. 
"It is assumed that proper objection 'was made; 
if it was not, the error is not reversible." 3 Am. 
Jur., pp. 609-610, Sec. 1062. 
Appellant's second proposition is ridiculous. 
On page 22 of their brief counsel query, "Can de-
fendants complain if the evidence fails to show all that 
plaintiffs allege and sliows merely an actionable part of 
it f '' Plaintiff's pleadings do not allege nor does her 
evidence show any actionable negligence on the part of 
the defendants if the bus did not strike the Sorensen car. 
Counsel say that the plaintiff should not be precluded 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
from recovery simply because the jury finds that the 
bus only crowded the Sorensen car off the road and did 
not actually strike it. There is not one word of evidence 
or one inference in the record that the bus simply 
crowded the Sorensen car off the road without striking 
it. If the jury were at liberty to make such a finding, 
they could only do so by some speculation of their own 
and by disbelieving the testimony of every occupant in 
the Sorensen car, in which case plaintiff would have no 
evidence whatever to go to the jury. 
The fact of the matter is, however, that there is no 
question of ''variance" involved in this case. There is 
no variance beween plaintiff's pleading and her proof. 
Counsel themselves apparently overlook the fact that 
they concede the same thing. On pages 1 and 2 of their 
brief they say: 
"The plaintiff's and the defendants' evidence 
differed as to how the accident occurred. The 
difference consisted in plaintiff's evidence which 
showed that the ·bus, while travelling north on the 
aforesaid highway at the time and place alleged, 
sideswiped an automobile driven by Rose Soren-
sen, which was traveling in the opposite direc-
tion, causing said automobile to careen out of 
control onto the side of the road on which the 
automobile, in which plaintiff was riding as a 
passenger, was traveling. As a result, the Soren-
sen car crashed into the car in which plaintiff was 
riding and plaintiff sustained the serious and 
permanent injuries complained of. The defend-
ants' version of the accident differs principally 
in the fact that they deny that the bus struck the 
Sorensen car.'' 
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Plaintiff's whole complaint is founded upon the theory 
that our bus hit the Sorensen car' and that the impact 
was the sole cause of the collision between the Sorensen 
and Anderson cars and the resulting injuries. Para-
graph 4 of their complaint states, ''striking the front 
left portion of an automobile driven by Rose Sorensen, 
traveling in a southerly direction on said highway, with 
the left rear portion of the defendant company's bus, 
knocking said automobile out of control so that the same 
ran into and against the front portion of the automobile 
in which plaintiff was riding.'' 
The specific acts of negilgence charged against us, 
aside from one that we were traveling in excess of 5(J 
miles an hour which was not presented to the jury be-
cause of a total lack of evidence, are all based exclusively 
on the fact that we ran into the 8orensen car. A8 we 
have already pointed out in the resume of the testimony, 
every one of plaintiff's witnesses who attempted to ac. 
count for the accident stated that it was the impact of 
the bus that started the trouble. In fact, Cleone Jensen 
stated that was the only thing she was sure of. Accord-
ing to them, the impact knocked them dazed, knocked the 
left front fender down onto the wheel, knocked the 
Chevrolet out of control. The whole issue was whether 
or not the bus hit the Chevrolet. Our entire testimony 
was directed to meeting this issue. At no time did we 
have any intimation that we were called upon to defend 
ourselves against a claim that our bus merely crowded 
the Sorensen car off the road. The fact of the matter 
is that the argument of variance is a pure afterthought, 
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concocted out of thin air and not even built upon shift-
ing sands. It doesn't have any foundation upon which 
to rest, and to attempt to insert it into this case is absurd. 
A consideration of the entire record in this case con-
vinces one that it would have been difficult, if not impos-
sible, for an unbiased jury to arrive at any other result 
than the one reached herein, and that plaintiff had a 
full and fair trial and that the correct verdict was 
rendered. The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RicH, RicH & STRONG, and 
SHIRLEY P. JoNEs, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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